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Abstract
The paper empirically analyses the cross-countries determinants of nonperforming loans and
the potential impact of regulatory factors on credit risk exposure. We employ aggregate
banking, nancial, economic and legal environment data for a panel of 59 countries over the
period 2002-2006. Empirical results indicate that higher capital adequacy ratio and prudent
provisionning policy seem to reduce the level of problem loans. We also report a desirable
impact of private ownership, foreign participation and bank concentration. Our ndings do
not support the view that market discipline leads to better economic outcomes and to reduce
the level of problem loans. In contrast, all regulatory devices either exert a counterproductive
impact on bad loans or do not signicantly enhance credit risk exposure for countries with
weak institutions, corrupt business environment and little democracy.Our results are interest-
ing for regulators, bankers and investors as well. To reduce credit risk exposure, the effective
way to do it is through enhancing the legal system, strengthening institutions and increasing
transparency and democracy, rather than focusing only on regulatory and supervisory issues.
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1
1 Introduction
Despite ongoing efforts to control bank lending activities, non performing loans (NPL) are still a major concern for both international
and local regulators. In this context, the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans is commonly used by international regulatory and supervi-
sory bodies (IMF, World Bank and BIS) to assess the strength of the banking industry in each country.According to the Global Financial
System Report (IMF, 2007), the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans varies considerably amongst countries with values ranging between
0.2% for Australia to 26.5% for Egypt, over the period 2002-2006.
In scholar studies, problem loans are often used as an exogenous variable to explain other banking outcomes such as bank perfor-
mance, failures, and bank crises. However, a limited number of studies investigates problem loans as an endogenous variable (Sinkey and
Greenwalt,1991; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997 and Salas and Saurina, 2002). In these studies NPL is explained either by bank specic or
by macroeconomic factors. Recently, the interest on the determinants of nonperforming loans has been reconsidered by various authors,
as data on problem loans became available. For instance, Breuer (2006), using Bankscope data, analyses the impact of legal, political,
sociological, economic, and banking institutions on problem bank loans. Nevertheless, her study suffers from a representativeness bias
due to the fact that Bankscope data on NPL are only available for a very limited number of countries and for a few numbers of banks.
Babihuga (2007) explores the relationship between several macroeconomic variables and nancial soundness indicators (capital adequacy,
protability and asset quality) based on country aggregate data. The limit addressed to this study is mainly methodological. Using various
econometric approaches, results are not conclusive as the choice of the econometric method depends on the data structure. Finally, a
new growing stream of literature, pioneered by Barth et al. (2004), investigates the impact of banking regulation and supervision factors
on various banking outcomes, such as nonperforming loans. They do not however control for non regulatory determinants of banking
outcomes.
The seminal works of Barth et al. (2004, 2006) highlighted the superiority of the private interest view over the public interest view in
governing banking systems. According to the authors, market imperfections are preferred to political imperfections in regard to economic
and nancial outcomes. The debate over which of the two points of view is preferred is yet uresolved. Some continue to argue that
empowering government regulation is the unique mean to overcome undesirable market imperfections. Others, stress out that a powerful
government and control agencies are associated with inefcient economic outcomes.
The aim of this study is rst to investigate the impact of bank industry factors on the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans. Based on
an extensive literature review, we propose a model relating nonperforming loans to banking industry features. The baseline model is then
used to examine the impact of the regulatory environment on reducing problem loans and hence banking sector fragility.
Our study contributes to the literature on problem loans in two ways. First, it examines aggregated data which best reect the level
of NPL of the banks in a country as opposed to individual data included in databases that suffer from the problem of representativeness.
Second, to the best of our knowledge, no research has examined the impact of regulatory variables after controlling for bank industry
factors that alter primarily problem loans (as in Barth et al., 2004).
We use aggregate NPLs data drawn from the Global Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2007) over the period (2002-2006). The nal
sample consists on a panel of 59 countries for which bank industry and regulatory data are available. The empirical results show that a high
level of capitalization, a prudent provisioning policy, the concentration of the banking industry and the presence of foreign capital are the
main factors that reduce the level of NPL. However, the presence of state participation in banks appears to be increasing problem loans.
Furthermore, the results indicate that bank regulatory and supervisory variables, introduced one by one in the basic model, do not affect
the level of NPL. These variables work properly only in a healthy legal and democracy environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on bank industry and regulatory determi-
nants of nonperforming loans. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 4 and Section 5 respectively present and discuss
the empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Bank industry factors, supervision and nonperforming loans: literature review
2.1 Bank industry factors of nonperforming loans
Theoretically, the capital adequacy ratio might serve as a tool to control excessive risk taking by banks and to prevent them from being
insolvent through recapitalization (Basel accord). Banks with capital adequacy ratio (CAR) less than the regulatory minimum are forced
to adjust their balance sheet to comply with the regulatory requirement either by raising more capital (holding assets constant) or reducing
risk-weighted assets (holding capital constant). In fact, raising the level of capital relative to risky assets by either means could have a
benecial impact on the bank performance and soundness (Fries et al., 2002). Empirically, There is no consensus on the relation between
capital adequacy and non performing loans. On one hand, Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) show that banks with adequate capital ratio during
the three years preceding the year of study experience lower rates of NPLs. On the other hand, banks with high levels of CARs might be
encouraged to embark in riskier activities leading to riskier credit portfolios. Rime (2001) corroborates this argument. He puts forward that
Swiss banks tend to increase their capital adequacy ratio, as it approaches the minimum regulatory level.
Loan loss provisions are regarded as a controlling mechanism over expected loan losses. Under backward-looking provisioning prac-
tice, where provisions are triggered by default incidents on loans, higher levels of nonperforming loans are associated with high rates of
provisioning (Hasan and Wall, 2004). Banks anticipating high levels of capital losses might create higher provisions to decrease earnings
volatility and to reinforce medium term bank solvency. Managers can also use loan loss provisions to signal the nancial strength of their
banks as the willingness of a bank to provision for loan losses is regarded as a strong belief in the future performance of the bank (Ahmad
et al. 1999). The overall rate of provisioning reects the general attitude of the banking system toward risk control.
Bank protability may also determine the risk taking behavior of managers. Banks with high protability are less pressured to revenue
creation and thus less constrained to engage in risky credit offerings. At the same time, inefcient banks are more likely to experience high
levels of problem loans. Poor management can imply weak monitoring for both operating costs and credit quality of customers, which will
induce high levels of capital losses. Under this bad management hypothesis advanced by Berger and DeYoung (1997), managers lack
competencies to effectively assess and control risks incurred when lending to new customers. Godlewski (2004) using the adjusted ROA
as a proxy for performance, shows that banks protability negatively impacts the level of non performing loans ratio. However, using a
panel of 129 Spain banks during 1993-2000, Garciya-Marco and Robles-Fernandez (2007) nd that higher levels of return on equity are
followed by greater risk in the next period. They argue that prot-maximising policies will be accompanied by higher levels of risk.
State ownership seems to explain the behavior of risk taking of bankers and consequently the level of NPLs. Salas and Saurina (2002)
argue that to enhance the economic development of the country, state-owned banks have more incentives to fund riskier projects and to
allocate more favorable credits for small and medium rms. This inadequate risk taking behavior (compared to the return prole) will lead
to a higher level of NPLs. Micco et al. (2004) report that state-owned banks tend to have higher levels of NPLs, due to their weak credit
recovery capacity compared to privately owned banks. Others suggest that the interaction between private and state shareholding in the
same bank could determine the risk level taken by banks. Hu et al. (2004) argue that unjustied risky behavior is lower when the two
groups check and balance each other. In the opposite, when private and state shareholders collude (especially in societies with little civil
disciplines), problem loans will be higher due to risky credit offering. Tian (2000) suggests that under conditions of market imperfection,
due to a balancing mechanism between management incentives and bureaucracy forces, a mixed enterprise (joint shareholding of private
and state owners) will maximize social surplus. Novaes and Werlang (1995) report lower performance for state controlled banks in Brazil
and Argentina due to high proportion of problem loans given to government. Micco et al. (2004), examining 50000 nancial institutions
with different ownership types covering 119 countries, conclude that NPLs tend to be higher for banks with state ownership than for other
groups. This is explained by the development mandate given to state-owned banks in developing economies. Hu et al. (2004) examining a
panel of Taiwanese banks nd a positive correlation between capital share owned by the state and the level of NPLs. Garciýa-Marco and
Robles-Fernàndez (2007) examine the relationship between risk taking and ownership structure. They nd that commercial banks (mainly
private owned) are more exposed to risk than deposit banks (mainly state owned).
Foreign ownership is known to have a positive impact on banks' soundness. Levine (1996) suggests that foreign shareholding improves
the supply and the quality of nancial services, enhance the overall supervisory environment and ease the access to international nancial
markets. Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) report that the presence of foreign banks may enhance foreign direct investment in nonnancial
sector. Lensink and Hermes (2004) nd that foreign ownership leads to improve human capital through foreign manager which brings
better skills and technologies, in particular in developing countries. This international expertise will also lead to improve local competencies
through training and knowledge transfer. Empirically, Barth et al. (2002) nd a negative effect of foreign ownership on nonperforming
loans on a cross countries analysis. They highlight that foreign banks raise loan quality in a country and may lead to improve domestic
banks credit quality. Micco et al. (2004), examining a panel of emerging countries, nd that foreign controlled banks are more performant
than domestic ones. At the same time, Boubakri et al. (2005) show that foreign participation reduces the level of risk taking amongst banks
on a sample of 81 banks from 22 developing countries.
Finally, the banking industry concentration can also affect the credit risk taking among banks (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2000). In
monopolistic banking markets, lending institutions are willing to charge higher interest rates in the future to recover the losses incurred
today. In this situation, lower quality rms will obtain loans from banks which leads to an increase in the NPLs in the future. This will
not happen in competitive markets where lower quality rms do not accept to be charged with interest rates above the market rates once
their difculties overcome. Petersen and Rajan (1995) nd that in concentrated banking systems, younger rms (supposed to be of lower
quality) are nanced by banks in comparison to more competitive markets, where rms use other instruments, leading thus to a higher
level of problem loans. At the same time, Breuer (2006) nds a small but a signicant positive association between banking industry
concentration and nonperforming loans.
2.2 Bank supervision and nonperforming loans
By its nature, the banking sector should be regulated and supervised to ensure the nancial stability of the whole system. During the recent
decades, the banking sector has experienced sharp changes. Several reforms regarding the banking regulatory and supervisory have been
initiated since 1988 (Basel I) and reviewed in 2004 (Basel II). The question of what and how regulation inuences the banking stability
and soundness remains a great source of debate. In previous studies, there is no consensus on what type of regulations and supervisory
practices promote bank development, enhance nancial stability, and facilitate efcient corporate nance (Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al.,
2006; Shaffer, 2008). In the remainder of this section, we examine the impact of the regulatory framework on problem loans. We use
four variables related to the level of capital requirement, the ofcial supervisory power, the market discipline, and the independence of
supervisory authority.
Regulatory and supervisory bodies emphasize the positive role of capital stringency as a buffer against losses and hence failures (De-
watripont and Tirole, 1994). Empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. Barth et al. (2004) study the relationship between
specic regulatory and supervisory practices and banking-sector development, efciency and fragility. They nd that stringent capital
requirements are associated with fewer nonperforming loans but are not robustly linked with other banking outcomes. Pasiouras (2008)
reports a positive association between technical efciency and capital requirements, albeit not statistically signicant in all cases. Other
studies indicate that capital requirements increase, on the contrary, risk-taking behavior (e.g. Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Blum, 1999).
Godlewski (2004), reports that capital regulation in the banking industry is positively related to excess risk taking. The increased credit
risk leads to an increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans. He explains that stringent constraints on capital imply additional pressure
on assets returns, which could be done through higher risk taking. Pasiouras et al. (2006) nd a negative relationship between capital
requirements and banks' soundness as measured by Fitch ratings. Delis et al. (2008) examining a panel of transition countries, argue that
capital requirements does not appear to have a statistically signicant impact on productivity.
Granting broad powers to supervisors remain a subject of controversial debates. From a theoretical point of view, increased ofcial
supervisory power is benecial for the development and the stability of the nancial system. Barth et al. (2004) argue that, due to market
imperfections, ofcial supervision may constitute a better substitute to market failure and contribute to further stabilize the nancial system.
However, under specic circumstances, such as corrupt environment or lack of democracy and civil discipline, powerful supervision will
hinder the performance and the efciency of the nancial system (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Levine, 2003). Barth et al. (2004) show
that broader supervisory power is associated with higher problem loans and hampers bank development, especially inside closed political
systems. Pasiouras et al. (2006) also nd evidence for the negative impact of supervisory power and credit ratings.
Market discipline function has not received sufcient interest from researchers, although it is one of the pillar of the Basel II accord.
Private monitoring promotion is considered to lead to more efcient banking sector, owing to accurate information disclosure (Hay and
Shleifer, 1998) and less corruption of bank ofcials (Beck et al., 2006). Empirically, Barth et al. (2004) report no evidence of a relationship
between enhanced information disclosure and other regulatory incentives and banking fragility. Recently, Barth et al. (2006) revisiting the
market discipline function, indicate that the positive impact of private monitoring on bank lending relies on the quality and the development
of the legal system and the governmental institutions effectiveness. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008) nd that sounder banks are located in
countries where nancial data on banks have to be reported regularly and accurately to regulators and market participants.
Finally, the independence of supervisory authorities is deemed to have an impact on problem loans. Theoretically, the independence
of supervisory authorities is supposed to lead to healthier nancial system, as political interference in monetary policies is shown to have
various undesirable consequences. Barth et al. (2006) suggest that the extant to which bank supervisors are politically and economically
pressured or inuenced, may condition disciplinary actions enforcement on banks. However, many policy makers are still opposed to such
independency. They fear that this will lead to create states into states, particularly in developing economies. Hüpkes et al. (2006) advocate
the need to draw up accountability on supervision agencies to promote their performance and enhance their legitimacy. Abrams and Taylor
(2001), among others, stress the need to entrust bank supervision to central banks, which are considered to be more independent than banks
supervision bodies, especially in emerging countries. Empirically, Donzé (2006) nds supervision independence to be positively associated
to sounder banking systems. Klomp and Haan (2008) considering data for 70 countries, report a negative relationship between central bank
independence and nancial instability.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
This study considers aggregated data on nonperforming loans. This choice is motivated by the fact that data on nonperforming loans for
individual banks are available only for a very limited number of countries. As noted by Hasan and Wall (2004), only US banks provide full
information on their nancial outcomes and particularily on problem loans. They emphasize the challenges that face researchers examining
nonperforming loans data on other countries. For instance, the Bankscope database, which provides the widest coverage of countries and
banking organizations1, suffer from representativeness bias. Breuer (2006) albeit considering only countries providing NPL data for at
least four banks, information used don't represent the aggregate level of bad loans as published by the IMF. To our knowledge, except the
study by Babihuga (2007), this paper pioneers the research work investigating the determinants of nonperforming loans at the aggregate
level.
We use aggregate Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) data drawn from the IMF Global Financial Stability Report (2007)2, which
provides a unique information set for 95 countries3 during the period 2002-2006. We started our sample selection by considering all
the countries available in the IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2007. We then excluded 19 countries for which informations on
nonperforming loans, capital adequacy ratio, return on asset and provisions are missing. We further excluded 4 countries for which data on
nancial development, are missing in the nancial development report. Finally, we excluded 12 countries not included in the World Bank
(WB) database on regulations and supervision (Barth et al., 2001, 2006) or for which regulatory variables were not available. Table (1)
illustrates these different treatments. The nal data set includes 59 countries4 for which data are available for all variables. This resulted in
a data set of 295 country-year observations.
1 Full data on NPL are available only for the USA.
2 Some missing data are collected from Central Banks reports of countries and individual reports of the IMF (FASP).
3 Brazil was excluded from the full sample because it is characterized by high level of ination even compared to others similars countries (Arestis et al., 2006).
4 Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, CostaRica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela.
Table 1
Data construction
Missing Variables Countries
Nonperforming loans Albania, Montenegro, Romania, Austria, Malta, Lesotho, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone
Capital adequacy ratio Argentine, Albania, Montenegro, Ireland, China, Lesotho, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone
Return on asset Montenegro, Netherlands, China, Gabon, Lesotho, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone
Loan loss reserves to total loans Guatemala, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia,
Malta, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg.
Financial development5 Belarus, Dominican, Lebanon, Mozambique,
Regulatory and Supervisory variables Namibia, Ukraine, UAE, Swaziland, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay,
Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Singapore Armenia, Georgia
3.2 Variables denition
We employ a sample of 59 countries over the period 2002-2006 to investigate bank industry determinants of nonperforming loans and the
role of the supervisory framework. The bank industry factors include the one year lagged bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets
minus the required minimum capital (Difcart 1). This measure is more appropriate than using the absolute level of the regulatory capital
because it controls the differences in the regulatory minimum solvency ratio between countries. This category is composed also of the
one year lagged loan loss reserves to total loans ratio (Provt 1), the one year lagged return on assets ratio (ROAt 1), the percentage of
state-owned banks (State); the percentage of foreign ownership (Forg) and the percentage of assets held by the ve largest banks (Conc)
as a measure for the bank concentration. Finally, we introduce two control variables : the lagged real GDP growth (GDPgrt 1) and the
level of nancial development (Fin_Dev). Appendix 1 provides further details on variables calculations and sources of information.
To study the supervisory and regulatory environment, we use an assortment of indicators from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001,
2004) database developed on 3 versions 6. Since this database is available at only three points in time, we used information from Version
2 for the period 2002-2004, and from Version 3 for the period 2005-2006. A growing number of papers use the information contained in
this data set to examine the impact of bank supervision and regulatory policies on bank performance, stability, and corporate nance (e.g.,
Beck et al., 2003; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2003).
To test the effect of the regulatory and supervisory factors on problem loans, we include four variables. First, to account for both
initial and overall capital stringency, we introduce the Capital regulatory index (Car_index), which is supposed to capture both the overall
stringency (amount of capital) and the initial capital stringency (veriable sources of capital) with higher values indicating higher capital
stringency. The second variable is the supervisory power (Pow_sup), which indicates the ability of supervisors to exercise their power and
get involved in banking decisions. Then, to capture the impact of private monitoring on problem loans, we use the (Priv_mon), which
indicates the degree of information that is released to ofcials and the public, auditing related requirements and whether credit ratings are
required. A higher values indicating more private oversight. This rst three variables may be seen as reecting the three pillars of Basel II
accord. Finally, the impact of the independence of supervision authority on nonperforming loans is captured through the variable (Indep),
which indicates the level of independence of supervisory authority. Higher values signify greater independence.
5 This variable is introduced as a control variable in the model. it measures "the factors, policies, and institutions that lead to effective nancial intermediation and markets,
and deep and broad access to capital and nancial services" (Financial Development Report, 2008).
6 Survey 1, 2 and 3 established in 1999, 2001 and 2006, respectively.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Summary descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table (2)7. We note particularly that NPL
rate presents a higher disparity between countries with a minimum of 0.2% and maximum of 26.5%. A similar pattern is observed for
the provision variable ranging between 18.6 % and 276.9%. Furthermore, we remark that some countries have a negative GDP growth
rate and/or negative banking performance with minimum values of -8.86% and -8.9% respectively. With regard to the ownership structure,
foreign bank participation seems to be higher than state property with respectively mean values of 33% and 14%. Finally, banking systems
tend to be strongly concentrated with an average of 66%.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for nonperforming loans and bank industry variables
Variables Mean Median Min Max SD
NPL 6.52 3.7 0.2 26.5 6.77
Difcart 1 5.33 4.70 -3.50 21.50 3.44
Provt 1 82.63 70.40 18.60 276.90 43.33
Roat 1 1.38 1.10 -6.10 8.70 1.27
State 0.14 0.04 0 0.92 0.21
Forg 0.33 0.21 0 0.99 0.30
Conc 0.66 0.67 0.14 1 0.19
GDPgrt 1 4.08 3.91 -8.86 21.18 3.17
Where NPL is the aggregate rate of nonperforming loans, Difcar is the difference between
the capital adequacy ratio and the minimum required, Prov is the bank provisions to
nonperforming loans, ROA is Bank Return on assets, State is Government owned bank
assets divided by total bank asset, Forg is Foreign-owned bank assets divided by total
bank, Conc is Percentage of assets held by the ve largest banks, GDPgr is the annual
real growth rate of GDP.
The correlation matrix of the bank industry variables (appendix 3) shows statistically signicant correlations between NPLs and all of
the explanatory variables except for the one year lagged ROA and Foreign ownership. The coefcients indicate no signicant correlations
between the independent variables included. Descriptive statistics for regulatory variables are presented in table (4)8 .
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for regulatory and supervisory variables
Variables Mean Median Min Max SD
Pow_sup 11.24 11.5 5 15.5 2.55
Priv_mon 8.27 8 4 11 1.34
Indep 1.68 2 0 3 0.93
Car_index 5.52 6 2 9 1.72
Where Pow_sup is the ofcial supervisory power, Priv_mon is the private monitoring index, Indep
is the Independence of supervisory authority, and Car_index is the capital regulatory index.
7 Descriptive statistics by country are presented in appendix 2.
8 Fore more details, see appendix 4 for summary statistics of regulatory and supervisory variables by country.
3.4 Methodology
To investigate the bank industry determinants of the aggregate nonperforming loans and the impact of supervisory environment, we use two
specications. The baseline model regresses the bank industry variables on nonperforming loans. Lagged GDP growth rate and nancial
development are use as control variables. The second specication examines the impact of bank regulation factors by reestimating the
baseline model including each of the four regulatory variables. The baseline model is expressed as follows,
NPLit = 0 + 1Difcarit 1 + 2 Pr ovit 1 + 3ROAit 1 + 4Stateit (1)
+5Forgit + 6Concit + 7GDPgrit 1 + 8Fin_Devit + "
Where NPL is the aggregated nonperforming loans to total loans ratio, (Difcart 1); is the one year lagged bank regulatory capital
to risk-weighted assets minus the required minimum capital, (Provt 1) is the one year lagged loan loss reserves to total loans ratio,
(ROAt 1) is the one year lagged return on assets ratio , (State) is the percentage of state-owned banks, (Forg) is the percentage of
foreign ownership, (Conc) is the percentage of assets held by the ve largest banks, (GDPgrt 1) is the one year lagged real GDP growth
rate, and (Fin_Dev) is a measure of the level of country nancial development.
We use a pooled regression approach. Panel data combines both time series and cross-section data. First, it has the advantage to increase
the number of observations, degrees of freedom and reduce collinearity among explanatory variables especially when the number of years
is low. Second, pooling enables controlling for exogenous shocks common to all banks (time effects) and reducing the omitted variable
bias (unit effects). However, simple pooled regression may not be well designed to capture relationships between dependant variable
and explanatory variables9. This is due to the fact that pooled regression assumes homogenous behavior of endogenous variable for all
individuals in the sample (same intercept and same slopes). This is not obviously the case for the variable NPL, as it varies considerably
between countries and years. Several alternative estimation methods are more suitable for panel data (xed and random effects). Using
the Hausman test, the xed effect specication is preferred. However, the use of xed effects specication raises, two concerns. First, as
noted by Haas and Lelyveld (2006), unit dummies are known to eliminate too much cross-sectional variance. Second, the inclusion of units
dummies eliminate de facto time invariant exogenous variables and does not properly capture the impact of quasi time invariant variables
(Beck, 2005). With regard to error structure, the xed effects specication assumes that the error terms have a constant variance over
time and are serially uncorrelated. Another possible solution would have been to include country-specic dummies to capture the xed
effects. This would have considerably reduced the degrees of freedom (Haas and Lelyveld, 2006). Moreover, the country-specic effect
is captured through the inclusion of macroeconomic and structural variables related to the nancial sector. To further control for possible
differences between countries, we introduced a dummy variable for the level of nancial development. Also, we are rather interested in
making inferences with respect to population characteristics than in estimating the country-specic effect.
We also turned to test the heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation problems. Contemporaneous correlation (i.e. the errors across
cross-sectional units are correlated due to common shocks in a given time period), panel heteroskedasticity (i.e., the error variance differs
across cross-sectional units due to characteristics unique to the units), and serial correlation (i.e., the errors within units are temporally
correlated) characterize our data structure. Feasible generalized last squares(FGLS) specication can be used after controlling for the
heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation problems. However, Beck and Katz (1995, 1996), advocate the use of the Panel Corrected
Standard Errors (PCSE) method to improve inferences by taking into account the complexity of the error process. Based on Monte Carlo
studies, Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) demonstrate that PCSE produces more reliable standard errors than FGLS method.
9 Hsiao test rejects the homegeneity of data structure.
4 Empirical results
Table (4) shows the empirical results of the basic model. Model 1 presents results for the baseline model. Model 2 to model 5 exhibit
results for the regulatory factors. The estimated coefcients on the banking industry variables appears to be robust to the specication
used. The regressions show evidence of a negative impact of the variable (DifCar) on the credit risk control suggesting that the capital
adequacy ratio might be used as a regulatory device to mitigate banks excessive risk taking. In fact, it seems that the regulatory capital
serves as an indicator of the nancial risk exposure of the whole banking system. We nd also a signicant and negative relationship
between nonperforming loans and lagged loan loss provisions rate (Prov). Countries with higher rates of problem loans exhibit lower
level of provisions rates and vice versa. This contradicts the theoretical assertion, which predicts the use of provisions as a risk control
tool and therefore to be positively related to problem loans. It appears that countries with low rates of nonperforming loans adopt a better
provisioning policy (higher loan loss provisions). This may reect the general attitude toward risk in the banking industry of each country.
In countries where risk control is more effective and considered as an essential component of the bank strategy, loan loss provisions are
used, among other means, to hedge future exposures to credit risk.
However, we do not nd any evidence of the relationship between NPL and ROA. We give the following explanations to this surprising
result. First, it is possible that the relation between performance and risk taking do not hold at the aggregate level, while it holds at the bank
rm level. In fact, the overall performance of the banking system may hide severe variation in the individual performance of banks, while
the aggregate level of nonperforming loans exhibit lesser variation. Second, the absence of any relation between performance and NPLs
could be due to the inclusion in the sample of countries with different level of performance. In fact, while in developing economies, revenue
creations pressures play a central role in shaping lending activities of banks, banks experiencing such pressures in developed countries do
not necessarily embark in riskier lending offerings (in an aggregate level), as they may turn to other non credit revenues to respond to the
revenue creation pressure.
The estimate coefcients on state property (State) are positive and signicant. It appears that state-ownership rises the level of
problem loans. This could be explained either by the development mandate given to state-owned banks, especially in developing countries,
or by their weaker credit recovery capacities. These combined effects lead to higher credit risk taking and to increased defaults. This result
corroborates that of Micco et al. (2004) who conclude that NPLs tend to be higher for state-owned banks on a panel of emerging countries.
Foreign participation (Forg) is found to have a positive effect on reducing the degree of bank problem loans. It appears that foreign
ownership appears to contribute to the reduction of nonperforming loans This result corroborates the ndings of Levine (1996) and Barth et
al. (2002) who highlights the positive impact of foreign shareholding on nancial outcomes. Another plausible explanation for this result
is that banks with foreign participation are subject to more stringent control due to a more restrictive regulatory framework (from their
home regulatory authorities) than domestic banks, which are supposed to have weaker institutions. Furthermore, as noted by Lensink and
Hermes (2004), foreign ownership contributes to improve human capital and management efciency as it brings better skill, technologies,
and risk management practices, in particular in developing countries.
Finally, we nd a negative relationship between bank concentration and the NPL. This result suggests, that in a concentrated banking
market, risky borrowers cannot easily access to credit from large banks that monopolize the banking sector (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2000).
On the other hand, in a non concentrated market, as competition among lenders increases it leads banks to relax the credit constraints and
rises loans defaults occurrence.
We now turn to the investigation of the impact of the regulatory environment on problem loans. For all the specications used, the main
relations remain the same for all variables of the basic model, indicating the robustness of our previous results. However, all regulatory
variables introduced are not signicant. It seems that the regulatory channel is not the optimal device to reduce risk taking and hence
problem loans. The ineffectiveness of all the statutory powers examined in our study corroborates the growing literature on the absence
of any relationship between regulation and banking outcomes. However, as noted by several authors, the inefcacy of regulatory devices
may be due to the fact that the measures used for regulatory variables used, as noted by Barth et al. (2006), "relate to statutory powers".
Second, the efcacy of regulatory reforms depends mainly on the quality and the effectiveness of political and social institutions. The next
section seeks to expose and to explain the different aspects related to this issue.
5 Discussion : explaining the ineffectiveness of regulatory devices
Hafeez (2003) stresses out that political institutions, corruption, rule of law and protection of property rights play a central role in
the efcacy of regulatory reforms. As noted by Barth et al. (2006), strengthening ofcial supervision will enhance the overall nancial
development. The previous studies dealing with banking regulation do not, however, consider whether the effective implementation of
those regulations play any role in the efcacy of such policies. To further investigate the impact of regulatory and supervisory framework
on problem loans, we introduced three interactions to account for possible effect of the political and legal environment on the effectiveness
of regulation. We hence consider three factors : the level of corruption, the degree of democracy and the rule of law.
Barth et al. (2006) highlight that conventional ofcial regulation and supervision do not improve banking outcomes, especially in
countries with weak political institutions. They emphasize that empowering ofcial supervision and regulation will lead to an increase
in corrupt bank lending. Anderson (2004) supports this view. He nds that conventional government regulation is more likely to be
counterproductive as regulators are less competent than bankers and are exposed to corruption and to political pressure. They end up by
serving the interest of the banking industry and pressure groups either than serving the public interest. Corruption could also be present in
privately owned banks especially in societies with little democratic traditions and civil discipline (Finkel et al., 2000; Johnson and Wilson,
2000). In such societies, decision makers are exposed to informal connections and other pressures from groups seeking for unjustied or
illegal economic rents. The level of corruption is accounted for by the corruption perception index (CPI) which ranges from ten (squeaky
clean) to zero (highly corrupt). To introduce the interactions terms, we constructed a dummy variable taking 1 for countries with CPI value
less than 5 and 0 otherwise.
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On the other hand, Barth et al (2004) stress out that ofcial supervision may be harmful to the development of the banking sector
in countries with less political openness. According to Sobel (2003), the level of democracy which depends on the extant of political
and civil freedom, will shape regulatory vulnerability to political and other groups pressures. In fact, democratic governments through
countervailing forces and institutions will be constrained to pursue public interest (Tsebelis, 1995 and Eichengreen, 1998). The extant
to which democracy and political participation shape economic outcomes is somewhat controversial. Wittman (1995), Pastor and Sung
(1995) and Leblang (1997) argument that enhanced democracy precludes economic growth. Helliwell (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) suggest that democracy is negatively linked to economic outcomes. Finally, Keech (1995) and Clague et al. (1996) nd mixed
results. Barth et al. (2006) suggest taking into account the level of democracy in the country when evaluating the impact of supervisory
independence on banking sector outcomes. The level of democracy is accounted for by the democracy index which ranges between 0
(authoritarian regime) and 10 (full democracy). Then, we constructed a dummy variable taking 1 for countries with democracy index value
superior to 6 (democratic countries) and 0 otherwise (the Economist intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, 2008).
Finally, the extant to which contracts and laws are enforced in the country may impact the efcacy of the implementation of both existing
and newly implemented regulations. This is particularly true as the global economy is moving toward market based systems. On the other
hand, Carothers (1998) notes that the rule of law is central to both economic development and democracy. Besides, international institutions
are devoting considerable resources to strengthen legal institutions in several countries. To account for the level of law enforcement, we
use the rule of law index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008). It ranges between -2.5 (worst execution of laws) to 2.5 (best enforcement).
We introduce a dummy variable that takes 1 for countries with values of rule of law index superior to median and 0 otherwise.
In contrast with Barth et al. (2006), who consider only the impact of these variables to examine their impact on bank crisis and
other nancial outcomes, we investigate this channel through the inclusion of interaction terms between the three political and business
environment variables and each of the regulatory and supervision variables.
Results for the full model including each of the supervisory and regulatory variables together with the interaction terms are reported
in table (5) through , (7). The main relations remain the same for all variables of the basic model (bank industry variables), indicating the
robustness of our previous results.
Table (5) presents regression results after controlling for the level of corruption. It appears that in countries with little corruption, only
the level of independence of the supervision authority seems to reduce the level of non-performing loans. The other three regulatory devices
considered in our study have no signicant impact on the level of problem loans. In this regard, we consider our results contradictory to
those of Barth et al (2004 and 2006). In fact, they conclude for the superiority of the self-regulated systems (private interest view) based
on the signicance of the relationship between banking outcomes and the market discipline after controlling for the degree of corruption.
Our results add inconsistency to this point of view which is, yet, conrmed by the 2008 crisis.
At the opposite, in corrupt systems the strength and the empowerment of regulation and ofcial supervision seem to be counterpro-
ductive. All the interaction terms are signicantly positive. It seems that in corrupt banking markets, where civil discipline is low and
institutions are weak, the regulatory channel is not the optimal device to reduce risk taking and hence problem loans.
Table (6) exhibits the results of regressions after taking into account the level of democracy of a country. First, we nd that the stringency
of regulatory capital, ofcial supervisory power and the independence of supervisory authority positively impact lending activities and
hence reduces the level of problem loans in politically opened countries. In contrast, there is no support for the view that private monitoring
boost nancial stability. We consider our ndings as an evidence (albeit not strong) against the view for the superiority of private interest
view over the public interest view. Second, for countries with little democratic roots, the results show no signicant impact of regulatory
traits on the level of problem loans.
Table (7) reports the results for the regression using the interaction between regulatory variables and the rule of law. The results show
clearly that in countries where laws are better enforced, regulatory devices seem to have a positive impact on the quality of loans. In
contrast, in countries with weak rule of law, the stringency of regulatory capital and private monitoring have an adverse impact on problem
loans and lending activities. There is however no support for any impact of the other two regulatory traits.
The empirical results are broadly corroborating the growing number of studies which suggest that there is no consensus as to what
constitutes good regulation and supervision, or how specic regulations inuence the performance and stability of the banking sector (see
e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008; Shaffer, 2008). Our results stress further the inefcacy of regulations
based on market discipline and indirect monitoring, especially in immature markets. Our results conrm that prior to regulation reforms,
international institutions have to focus on enhancing market transparency, law enforcement, promoting healthy political institutions and
increasing transparency and accountability.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an empirical framework to investigate the bank industry factors and supervisory determinants of nonper-
forming loans on a cross-country basis. We propose a baseline model expressing problem loans in terms of bank industry specic variables.
These variables capture many of the factors suggested by the theory and highlighted by case studies. Besides, to investigate the role of the
regulatory framework on credit risk outcomes, we introduce variables on banks regulation and supervision. Finally, to assess the impact
of the effective implementation of those regulations, we experiment interactions of three institutional variables (corruption, democracy and
rule of law) with each of the supervision proxies.
Using aggregate data on a panel of 59 countries over the period 2002-2006 and robust econometric techniques, we nd strong evidence
on the association between NPLs and bank specic variables. Particularly, higher capital adequacy ratios and higher provision seem to
reduce the level of problem loans. We also report a desirable impact of private ownership, foreign participation and bank concentration on
the stability of the bank sector. Amongst the control variables, only nancial development appears to explain the level of nonperforming
loans. Economic conditions do not signicantly impact bank credit outcomes.
Finally, we examine the extant to which regulatory and supervisory framework has a positive impact on credit risk exposure. Our
primarily results indicate no support for any relation between ofcial supervision and problem loans. This adds to the growing evidence
against the effectiveness of such devices. However, our results suffer from the fact that the measures we used are, as noted by Barth et
al. (2006), statutory variables. Thus, they do not address the issue of the effective implementation of supervisory reforms. To investigate
this channel, we introduce three interaction using the level of corruption, the degree of political openness and the rule of law. All of these
variables are supposed to have an impact on the efcacy of regulation.
Our ndings do not support the view that market discipline will lead to better economic outcomes and to reduce the level of problem
loans. In contrast, all regulatory devices either exert a counterproductive impact on problem loans or do not signicantly enhance credit
risk exposure for countries with weak institutions, corrupt business environment and little democracy.
Overall, our empirical analysis show that nonperforming loans are mainly driven by bank specic factors. Differences in capital
adequacy ratios, provisions, bank ownership and the level of nancial development could explain the way problem loans are accumulated
in the countries of our sample. It appears also that to reduce credit risk exposure in countries with weak institutions, the effective way to
do is through enhancing the legal system, strengthening institutions and increasing transparency and democracy.
Appendix 1 : Variables denition
Denition Source
NPL Non performing loans to total loans IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2007
Difcar Bank Regulatory Capital to risk-Weighted IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2007
Assets - required minimum capital
Prov Bank provisions to non performing loans IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2007
ROA Bank Return on assets IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2007
State Government-owned bank assets divided by Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II (2002)
total bank and survey III (2006)
Forg Foreign-owned bank assets divided by total Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II
bank assets (2002) and survey III (2006)
Conc Percentage of assets held by the ve largest Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II (2002)
banks and survey III (2006)
GDPgr Annual real growth rate of GDP World Bank dataset (2006)
Dev_n is a dummy variable taking 1 for countries with nancial Financial development report (2008)
develomemnt index superior to median and 0 otherwise Values ranges between 1 and 7
Car_index The sum of overall capital stringency and Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II (2002)
initial capital stringency. and survey III (2006)
Pow_sup indicates the ability of supervisors to exercise Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II (2002)
their power and get involved in banking decisions. and survey III (2006)
Indep The independence of supervisory authorities Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II (2002)
is the degree to which bank supervisors should be and survey III (2006)
subject to political and economic policy pressure
and inuence.
Priv_mon Measures the degree to which the regulatory Barth, Caprio and Levine Survey II (2002)
authorities require reliable information disclosure and survey III (2006)
CPI is a dummy variable that takes 1 for countries with The Transparency International Corruption
score value inferior to 5 and 0 otherwise Perceptions Index : The scores range from ten
(squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt) (2008)
Democ is a dummy variable that takes 1 for countries with values The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of
superior to 6 (democratic countries) and 0 otherwise Democracy (2008), Value ranges between 0 and 10.
Rlaw is a dummy variable that takes 1 for countries with value Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators
of rule of law index superior to median and 0 otherwise Values range between -2.5 (worst governance)
and 2.5 (Best governance)
D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008).
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Appendix 4 : Descriptive statistics for regulatory variables by country
Country Car index Supervisory power Independence Private Monitoring
(CarIndex) (PowSup) (Indep) (PrivMon)
Australia 5.8 11.8 2.6 8.4
Belgium 4.2 10.4 2 7.6
Bolivia 4 10.8 2 7.6
Bulgaria 7 11 3 7.6
Canada 3 11 2.4 8.8
Colombia 4.2 13.6 0 9
Costa Rica 5.6 13 0.4 7.6
Croatia 4 11.2 2.4 8.2
Czech 5.2 8.8 2.6 7.6
Denmark 5.8 9.4 0.8 8.8
Egypt 4 14 2.6 8.4
Estonia 5 13 2 7
Finland 4.6 6 2 9.6
France 5.4 7.6 1 7.4
Germany 5.4 8 1 9
Ghana 6 12.4 1.4 5.2
Greece 5.2 11.2 1.6 8.4
Hungary 6 14.2 3 9.6
Iceland 6.8 5 0 8
India 7 10 2 8
Indonesia 7 15 2 10
Israel 5.6 7 1 8.8
Italy 4 7 0.8 8.6
Japan 5 11.4 1.4 9.2
Jordan 6.6 14 2.2 8
Kazakhstan 7 12 1 7.4
Kenya 6.6 13.3 2 9.2
Korea 3.4 12 1.6 9
Kuwait 7.4 9.6 2 10
Latvia 5.6 13 3 8.4
Lithuania 3.6 11 2 8.2
Malaysia 4.2 11 2.4 8.8
Mexico 6 8 0.4 10
Morocco 5.2 12.7 1 8.6
Nigeria 6.6 12.4 2.6 7.2
Norway 7.2 8.6 2.4 8
Oman 6 12 0 7
Pakistan 9 14 3 9
Panama 4.6 11.4 1 7.4
Paraguay 4 14 2 7
Peru 3.8 12 1.6 7.6
Philippines 5.8 11.8 1 8.2
Poland 3.6 8.4 0.8 8.6
Portugal 7.4 14 3 7
Appendix 4 : Descriptive statistics for regulatory variables by country (continued)
Country Car index Supervisory power Independence Private Monitoring
(CarIndex) (PowSup) (Indep) (PrivMon)
Russia 6.8 11.5 2 7.2
Salvador 3.6 10.4 1 9.2
Saudi Arabia 4.4 13.6 1.4 9.4
Slovak 5.4 13.6 1.6 6.8
South Africa 7.2 6 1.6 9.4
Spain 9 10 1.4 8.4
Sweden 2.8 6.8 2 8
Switzerland 6.4 14 2.2 8.2
Thailand 4.8 9.4 0 9.4
Tunisia 7 13 2 5
Turkey 6 15.5 1 9
USA 5.4 13.6 2.4 11
Uganda 8 15 3 7
United Kingdom 6.4 11 1.8 10.6
Venezuela 3.2 11.8 1 6.6
Where Pow_sup is the ofcial supervisory power, Priv_mon is the private monitoring index, Indep
is the Independence of supervisory authority, and Car_index is the capital regulatory index.
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